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INCOME TAX - CAPITAL GAINS
ASSIGNMENT OF PRODUCTION PAYMENTS
ORDINARY INCOME AND CAPITAL ASSET CONCEPTS
APPLICABLE TO ASSIGNMENTS OF
MINERAL INTERESTS
The income tax law provides preferential tax treatment
to gains realized from the sale or exchange of capital assets.'
Although the present provisions constitute just one of the
many methods employed by the government in taxing such
gains, some concession or preference in tax has been accorded
capital gains since the Revenue Act of 1921.2 It has been made
quite clear, however, that in affording taxpayers preferential
capital gains treatment the courts will narrowly construe the
extent to which such provisions may be applied.
Many of the present controversies which arise between
the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers claiming capital
gain treatment are in part dut to the fact that the 1954 Code
defines "capital asset" in the negative, that is by stating
that it consists of all property which does not fall within
specified categories. 4 T h e Supreme Court, in refusing to
provide relief to this dilemma, has stated that there is no
implication in the federal revenue law that state law should
govern whether a particular property interest represents a
capital asset.5 There has been, however, some clarification
provided by the courts with regard to transactions involving
mineral rights.

I INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1201.
2 1921 REV. ACT, § 206. See generally, 3B MERTENS L. FED. INc.
TAx. § 22.01 (1966).
8 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
4 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221.
5Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 104 (1932).
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An owner of the fee interest in land who grants to another the underlying minerals is normally held to have received ordinary income to the extent of the cash received
so long as the grantor retains a royalty interest 0 and the
grantee contractually agrees to develop the minerals.7 Where
the grantee undertakes no obligation to develop the property
there is authority that the grantor may treat the transaction
as a sale of a capital asset.8 A subsequent bona fide conveyance of all or an undivided interest in the royalty interest retained by the grantor constitutes a sale giving rise
to a capital gain or loss.9
If a production payment ° is retained upon a conveyance
of the mineral rights by an owner of developed property, the
conveyance of the mineral right represents a sale of a capital
asset so long as it can be shown that there are sufficient
mineral reserves available to satisfy the production payment
prior to exhaustion of such minerals." Where it is obvious
from the facts known at the time of the conveyance that
the retained production payment will not pay out and that
payments will continue over the productive life of the property, the interest retained is considered an economic interest
A royalty interest is a right to receive a specified percentage
of all oil and gas produced and lasts during the entire term
of the lease. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 410 (1940).
7Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945); Berg v Commissioner,
33 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
8 United States v. White, 311 F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1962).
9 R. R. Ratliff, 36 B.T.A. 762 (1937); G.C.M. 12118, XII-2 Cum.
BULL. 119 (1933).
10 A production payment is the right to a specified sum of
money, payable out of a specified percentage of the oil, or
the proceeds received from the sale of such oil, if, as and
when produced. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 410
(1940).
"Hammonds v Commissioner, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939);
Commissioner v. Fleming, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936); G.C.M.
22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss3/7

2

Keil: Capital Gains Assignment of Production Payments

19681

INCOME TAX

-

CAPITAL GAINS

in the property and ordinary income has been realized to
2
the extent of cash consideration received for such conveyance.
A taxpayer who assigns a production payment carved from
any type of depletable interest has realized ordinary income
to the extent of the consideration received for such assignment.'3
4
The position taken by the Internal Revenue Service,
and upheld by the courts, 1" with regard to assignments of
mineral rights therefore appears to have provided a rule
which turns on the question of whether the assignor has
retained in the property assigned an economic interest continuing over the life of the property. If no economic interest
has been retained, the assignment is properly classified as
a sale. If the taxpayer has retained an economic interest, the
consideration received for the assignment results in the immediate recognition of ordinary income.

Wiseman v. Barby'6
During 1947 Barby, who owned certain land in fee,
granted a mineral lease for a term of ten years. During
1956, while the minerals were still undeveloped, a new lease
superseding the 1947 lease, was granted to the same lessee.
In consideration for the 1956 grant, Barby received cash as
well as retaining a one-eighth royalty interest and a $300,000
production payment. Subsequently a fifty percent interest
in the production payment was sold to a third party with
'12 United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963).
13 Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).

G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 66; G.C.M. 27322, 1952-2
Cum. BuLL. 62; Rev. Rul. 63-120, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 141.
15 Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946);
United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963); McLean v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1941); Cullen
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1941).
16 Wiseman v Barby, 380 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1967), rev'd per
curiam, 390 U.S. 339 (1968).
14
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the remaining one-half interest being sold to another party
in the following taxable year.
The consideration received from the sales of each of
the interests in the production payment was reported as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset by the taxpayer in
each of the taxable years in which the sales occurred. The
commissioner sought to treat the proceeds from these sales as
ordinary income, asserting that it was not a conveyance of
a capital asset but rather an assignment of the right to receive
future ordinary income.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that,
although both the royalty interest and the production payment had been retained from the entire interest in the oil
and gas in place prior to the granting of the lease, the production payment was wholly separate and distinct from the
royalty interest, neither being dependent upon, carved out
of, or affected by the other.17 Therefore the sale of each undivided half of the production payment constituted a complete disposition of the property interest therein and was a
sale of the capital asset.
In order to determine that the interest conveyed constituted a capital asset, the court not only had to find that
a production payment is capable of representing a property
interest but also that such an interest may be separate and
distinct from a longer lived interest retained as a part of the
same transaction as that which created the production payment. While there is general acceptance of the fact that a
production payment may represent a property interest,18 the
determination of the second conclusion was more difficult and
certainly more critical to the final holding. To have held that
the production payment was not a property interest distinct
from the royalty also retained would have apparently lead
17

Id. at 123.
:8 Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 110 S.W.2d 53 (1937); see,
e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 264 (1958).
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to the conclusion that the production payment was in actuality carved out of the single interest retained.
In reversing the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the transaction resulted in the assignment of income rather than the sale of a separate and distinct
capital asset. 9 This decision was reached by applying the
holding in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc. 20 that ordinary
income results from the carving out of a depletable interest
from a longer lived asset.21 The holding in the instant case
appears to have established the rule that, although a taxpayer
purports to retain multiple interests, in reality only a single
property interest may be reserved and retained as a result
of a transaction in which a portion of a previously held
property interest is conveyed.
J. S. Keil
19

Wiseman v. Barby, 390 U.S. 339 (1968).

20

356 U.S. 260 (1958).

21

The holding in the Barby case upheld an earlier determination by the Fifth Circuit that the transfer of a production
payment right resulted in assignment of income. United
States v. Foster, 324 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1963); Floyd v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1962).
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